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ABSTRACT
The current design of BGP implicitly assumes the existence
of trust between ASes with respect to exchanging valid BGP
updates. This assumption of complete trust is problematic
given the frequent announcement of invalid — inaccurate
or unnecessary — updates. This paper presents AS-CRED,
a reputation service for ASes which quantifies the level of
trust one can have with respect to its announcing valid up-
dates. To compute the reputation, AS-CRED analyzes the
past updates announced by each observable AS in the In-
ternet, over a time-window, based on well-defined proper-
ties. It then classifies the resulting observations into mul-
tiple types of feedback. The feedback values are input into
a mathematical function for computing AS reputation. The
reputation is then used to track the instances of invalid up-
dates announced in the Internet and trigger alerts. The
contributions of the paper are: (1) a reputation service for
ASes, characterizing their trustworthiness; (2) a set of well-
defined properties for analyzing AS behavior; (3) a simple
reputation function and feedback mechanism; (4) a reputa-
tion portal which regularly publishes AS reputation; and (5)
a reputation-based alert service which tracks potentially in-
valid updates in the Internet. Detailed analysis of AS-CRED
demonstrates: (a) AS behavior is repetitive making reputa-
tion an effective trust metric, and (b) AS-CRED’s alerts for
invalid updates show an eight fold improvement over exist-
ing alert systems.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Protocols; C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]:
Network Operations
General Terms
BGP, autonomous systems, trust management, reputation,
alert service
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the standard com-
munication protocol for interconnecting large IP domains,
called Autonomous Systems (AS). BGP operates by exchang-
ing updates between ASes; which contains reachability infor-
mation for prefixes (IP address blocks). The current design
of BGP implicitly requires the existence of complete trust
between ASes exchanging BGP routing information. In real-
ity, this implicit assumption of complete trust is a cause for
concern as many ASes announce invalid updates for some or
all of their prefixes.
The invalidity of updates in the literature has usually re-
ferred to prefix hijacking — announcing the reachability to
a prefix which the AS does not own1 [17, 19]. Over the
past decade numerous cases of such inaccurate updates have
been documented. For example, AS7007 incident in 1997 [1]
and invalid announcement of prefixes belonging to eBay by
AS10139 [22]. However, our experiments with actual BGP
data revealed the existence of an additional type of invalid
updates, where the prefix being announced is repeatedly un-
stable. That is, ASes announce and withdraw prefixes they
own in quick succession, effectively making them useless for
data traffic. For example, AS37035 was seen announcing and
withdrawing the prefix 41.222.179.0/24, which it owns, 4824
times between Dec. 3, 2009 and Dec. 7, 2009. This amounts
to announcing (and withdrawing) the prefix repeatedly once
every 1.5 minutes, on average. Such unnecessary updates
increase the burden on the Internet where the routers are
already heavily loaded given its rapid growth [20].
We argue that it is useful to quantify the level of trust one
can have on an AS with respect to announcing valid up-
dates. We define a valid update as satisfying two condi-
tions: (1) it provides accurate routing information, i.e., no
prefix hijacking; and (2) the update itself is necessary for
the correct operation of the Internet, i.e., it is not part of a
sequence of short duration prefix announcements and with-
drawals. Much work has been done in detecting occurrence
of invalid updates in the Internet [13, 18, 17, 19, 21, 24].
These solutions however are limited to detecting inaccurate
updates, none of them are designed to address the necessity
aspect of update validity. In this paper, we present AS-
CRED, a reputation management service for Autonomous
Systems. It quantifies the level of “cred” (trust) one can
1We use the term own to describe prefixes allocated to ASes by
Internet address registries such as IANA, or those belonging to their
customers.
have in an AS’ tendency to announce valid updates. Trust
in AS-CRED is represented using a predictive metric called
reputation. To compute the reputation of an AS, AS-CRED
analyzes its past updates received, over a time-window based
on well-defined properties. Out of this analysis: it creates
a white-list of AS-prefix pairs which it considers legitimate,
and it provides feedback to a reputation function to com-
pute the reputation value of all the observable ASes in the
Internet. The reputation value and white-list are then used
to track the instances of inaccurate and unnecessary up-
dates announced over the Internet and trigger alerts. A
comparison of the alerts with well-known prefix hijacking
alert system Internet Alert Registry (IAR) [6] showed that
AS-CRED reduces the number of false positives (valid up-
dates flagged as invalid) by about eight fold. The analysis
time-window is shifted and reputation recomputed on a daily
basis, making it a dynamic value. Moreover, as BGP func-
tion by exchanging reachability information about all the
active ASes and prefixes in the Internet, AS-CRED can be
used to compute reputation values for the entire Internet at
the inter-domain level.
AS-CRED service has many uses: (1) Behavior Metric:
Its association of an objective and global trust metric with
every observable AS in the Internet allows ASes to not only
know about other ASes but also how it itself is perceived. AS
can now make better informed decisions in dealing with oth-
ers and tuning their business, traffic, scalability or security
policies, accordingly; (2) White-List: One of the byprod-
ucts of reputation computation is a white-list of AS-prefix
pairs which are legitimate (stable and legal). The white-list
can be used by ASes for tuning their import and export poli-
cies; (3) Expanded Alert Service: The alert mechanism
is unlike any existing alert systems available [6, 19], in that:
(a) it provides an alert for both inaccurate and unnecessary
updates announced, (b) it provides the reputation value for
the AS involved along with the alert, which is very useful for
understanding the behavior of ASes, and (c) the reputation
and alerts can provide effective diagnostic and forensic tool
to debug network connectivity issues at Internet scale; and
(4) Incentivization: The availability of reputation has the
potential to provide an incentive for ASes to improve their
behavior in the future.
The contributions of the paper are: (1) a reputation ser-
vice for ASes, characterizing their trustworthiness; (2) a set
of well-defined properties for analyzing AS behavior; (3) a
simple reputation function and feedback mechanism; (4) a
reputation portal which regularly publishes AS reputation;
and (5) a reputation-based alert service which tracks poten-
tially invalid updates in the Internet. Detailed analysis of
AS-CRED demonstrates: (a) AS behavior is repetitive mak-
ing reputation an effective trust metric, and (b) AS-CRED’s
alerts for invalid updates show an eight fold improvement
over existing alert system [6].
The paper is organized as follows; Section 2 presents the
background. Section 3 presents details of AS-CRED archi-
tecture and data source. Section 4 presents the feedback and
reputation model. Section 5 presents the AS-behavior anal-
ysis and reputation usage of AS-CRED. Section 6 presents
the results of our analysis of AS-CRED and performance re-
sults. Section 7 presents the related work. Finally, Section
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2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we present a brief overview of the Border
Gateway Protocol and the problem statement.
2.1 The Border Gateway Protocol
Border Gateway Protocol is a path-vector routing protocol
for exchanging information about reaching IP address blocks
(prefixes). Using BGP, an AS X, which owns a prefix p,
originates an update notifying its neighboring AS Y of its
ownership. AS Y then forwards this update further to its
neighbor AS Z by adding its own AS number to the path
vector, called AS PATH, in the update. This informs AS Z
that in order to reach the prefix p, the gateway router at AS
Y is the next hop. When an update is received at an AS (at
its BGP router), it determines whether the update should
be accepted or not. The acceptance of an update means
that the router is willing to add the route to the prefix, to
its routing table. Note that BGP itself does not have any
mechanism for making decisions regarding route preference.
Its only purpose is to convey the reachability of prefixes to
ASes. Each AS has its own policies that determine whether
it accepts a BGP update and whether it forwards it (up-
date) to its neighbors. Routing policies serve an important
purpose in BGP and provide an AS with not only the ca-
pability to prefer routes over others to reach a prefix, but
also to filter and/or tag update to change the route’s rel-
ative preference downstream. In terms of implementation,
AS policies are of three types - import, decision process, and
export. Import policies are used to determine which routes
to accept. Decision policies are then applied to the imported
routes to choose the best one for each prefix. Finally, export
policies are used to determine which neighbors get to know
about a particular route [11].
2.2 Problem Statement
The current version of BGP [2] was designed with only effec-
tiveness in mind. It implicitly assumes ASes can be trusted
to announce valid updates. An update is considered valid,
if it satisfies two conditions: (1) Accuracy: the information
in the update regarding announcement (or withdrawal) of
Consistency Verification Window (60 days)
Nov. 01, 2009 Nov. 11, 2009 Jan. 01, 2010
Alert Generation Windows (10 days)Learning Window (60 days)
Jan. 10, 2010 Jan. 21, 2010Nov. 22, 2009
Figure 2: Data Source Time Windows
a prefix is accurate. That is, the AS does not include in-
correct announcer or prefix information; and (2) Necessity:
the update is necessary for ASes in the Internet to be able
to reach the prefix contained within, in a sustained manner.
An update is considered invalid if it does not satisfy at least
one of these two conditions. The principal question being
addressed in this paper is, how to develop a trust metric for
ASes which characterizes their tendencies to announce valid
updates. In this work we assume that malicious ASes do not
arbitrarily modify the ID of the announcer of an update. We
believe that this assumption does not necessarily reduce the
importance of the problem being addressed as such attacks
can be only be mitigated by cryptographic approaches such
as S-BGP [18]. Moreover, this is a problem faced by all
schemes which deal with BGP update semantics, such as
prefix hijack detection, and is not unique to us.
3. REPUTATION FOR AUTONOMOUS SYS-
TEMS
In this paper, we present AS-CRED, a service for computing
and associating a trust value with ASes in the Internet. In
general, trust is defined as the subjective expectation in the
competence of an entity to act dependably within a particu-
lar context [14]. Here, the context in question is announcing
valid updates. One of the well known ways to quantify trust
is to use the notion of reputation. Reputation of an en-
tity is a characterization of its past in performing a specific
task. For entities that preserve their behavior, reputation
forms an effective predictive model. In order to use repu-
tation successfully, there are three prerequisites: (1) identi-
fying behaviors of interest; (2) monitoring for exhibition of
the behaviors; and (3) providing feedback on the experience.
Once the feedback has been received, the reputation can be
computed based on a well-defined mathematical function.
3.1 AS-CRED Architecture
Figure 1 shows the AS-CRED architecture. Its principal
task is to maintain reputation for every observable AS in
the Internet. AS administrators can query this database of
reputation to determine the extent of trust they can place on
the ASes of interest to them. AS-CRED has four main com-
ponents: (1) BGP Activity Manager: This is a database
which collects latest BGP updates from well-connected BGP
data collectors (e.g., RouteViews). The data provides a view
of all active ASes in the Internet and the prefixes that they
announce at different times; (2) Reputation Manager:
This computes the reputation of the ASes based on a well-
defined mathematical function using past behavior informa-
tion in the form of feedback; (3) AS-Behavior Analyzer:
This component analyzes the updates managed by the BGP
Activity Manager, within a specific time duration called the
learning window, based on a set of well-defined properties.
The results of the analysis, which is a classification of the
past behavior of ASes, forms the feedback for the Reputa-
tion Manager; (4) Reputation Portal: Once the AS repu-
tations are computed we have a (cumulative) value of their
trustworthiness, which is made available through a web por-
tal; and (5) Alert Manager: AS-CRED has the knowledge
of prefixes announced by different ASes over time, along with
their validity. It therefore uses this information, along with
AS reputation, to trigger real-time alerts regarding potential
invalidity of any new updates propagated within the Inter-
net.
Note that, AS-CRED dynamically updates reputation of
ASes as their behavior changes over time. In this regard,
the AS-Behavior Analyzer continuously evaluates the up-
dates received over a sliding window (which includes newer
updates and excludes old ones at the beginning of the win-
dow), and provides updated feedback for the Reputation
Manager. In the next three sections, we present these prin-
cipal components of AS-CRED architecture in detail. We
now present a brief description of the data source used for
populating the BGP Activity Manager.
3.2 Data Source
AS-CRED depends upon BGP updates to compute AS rep-
utation. We use the RouteViews BGP trace collector main-
tained by University of Oregon [9], to populate the BGP Ac-
tivity Manager. The RouteViews trace collector is a group
of BGP routers which peer with a large number of ISPs via
BGP sessions. At the time of writing, the RouteViews BGP
trace collector received BGP updates from 46 ASes. It has
been shown in [25] that RouteViews covers almost all the
ASes currently active within the Internet and is therefore a
good source for computing reputation of ASes. In this work,
we use data from Nov. 1, 2009 - Dec. 31, 2009 (see Figure 2).
This 60 day2 period is the learning window, based on which
AS behavior is analyzed and reputation is computed. We
wanted the learning window to be sufficiently long that it is
not biased by any transient AS behavior, more justification
for the choice is presented in Section 6.2. The reputation
of ASes is then used to generate alerts for the invalid up-
dates received on Jan. 1, 2010. The learning window is then
moved forward by one day now covering the days from Nov.
2, 2009 to Jan. 1, 2010, and alerts are generated for up-
dates received on Jan. 2, 2010. In this manner, we compute
reputation and generate alerts for 10 days covering Jan. 1,
2010 to Jan. 10, 2010. We call each day in this 10 day
period alert generation window. We find that recomputing
reputations once a day is sufficient from both a complexity
and predictive capability standpoint. The choice of 10 days
was to demonstrate the AS reputation trend over time. We
also define a third window called the consistency verification
window for purely analysis purposes. The consistency verifi-
cation window is used for verifying if the computed reputa-
tion is a good representation of the behavior analysis. The
consistency verification window is 60 days long and includes
both the 10 alert generation windows and 10 additional days.
The idea is to allow sufficient time for the AS-prefix pairs,
received after the learning window, to evolve and therefore
be analyzable with the benefit of hindsight.
4. AS REPUTATION MANAGEMENT
2In order to be fair, we did not consider updates announced within
24 hours of the end of the learning window in computing the rep-
utation of the ASes as such bindings have not had enough time to
prove themselves.
Table 1: AS-prefix Binding Stability for Documented Prefix Hijacking Instances
Date Prefix Hijacked Victim AS Attacker AS Duration # of Occurrence
Jan. 13, 2007 12.0.0.0/8 7018 31604 4 hours 26 minutes 1
Feb. 24, 2008 208.65.153.0/24 36561 (YouTube) 17557 9 hours 45 minutes 1
March 15, 2008 194.9.82.0/24 36915 6461 17 minutes 1
Dec. 2004 - Jan. 2005 61.0.0.0/8 NULL 4787 < 1 minute 100+
Dec. 2004 - Jan. 2005 82.0.0.0/8 NULL 8717 < 1 minute 100+
The reputation value assigned by AS-CRED to ASes is ac-
tually designed to characterize their “untrustworthiness” in
announcing valid updates. The reason for using reputation
to capture untrustworthiness is that ASes announcing valid
updates far outnumber those that do not. That the Internet
functions flawlessly most of the time is an attestation to this
fact. However, invalid updates have considerable negative
influence on the operations of large portions of the Inter-
net. A case in point is the invalid update announced by an
AS belonging to Pakistan Telecom, which altered the routes
to IP prefixes belonging to YouTube. This announcement
reportedly resulted in more than two-thirds of the Internet
not being able to access YouTube [7]. In this section, we
describe the types of feedback and the reputation function
used by the Reputation Manager.
4.1 Feedback Types
A feedback for AS-CRED is a tuples of the form {a, p, t},
where a is the AS announcing the prefix p at time-stamp t.
It can be of one of three types: (1) Good: This feedback is
provided each time an AS announces a required update with
accurate routing information. The AS and prefix involved
are referred to as exhibiting good behavior and are stored in
a set G where every tuple is of the form gi = {a, p, t}; (2)
Unnecessary (Bad): This feedback is provided each time
an AS accidentally announces unnecessary update. The AS
and prefix involved are stored in a set B where every tuple
is of the form bi = {a, p, t}; and (3) Inaccurate (Ugly):
This feedback is provided each time an AS announces an
inaccurate routing information. The AS and prefix involved
are stored in a set U where every tuple is of the form ui =
{a, p, t}.
The Good set keeps track of the valid prefixes announced by
ASes within the learning window. The Bad and the Ugly set
keep track of prefixes announced by ASes which are invalid
as a result of being unnecessary and inaccurate, respectively.
In the rest of the paper, we use the term GBU sets to refer
to the three feedback sets, collectively. The act of announc-
ing unnecessary or inaccurate updates are collectively called
poor behaviors. The GBU sets form the feedback that is
provided for AS reputation computation. Note that, an AS
may demonstrate good behavior for one prefix but simulta-
neously demonstrate poor behaviors for others. Also, at any
given time, a particular AS-prefix pair is exclusively clas-
sified in one of the three feedback types. Finally, as the
feedbacks are generated locally, we do not have to consider
the case of potentially dishonest feedback affecting our rep-
utation computation outcome.
4.2 AS Reputation Function
The reputation function computes the reputation of an AS
based on the feedback in the GBU sets. As reputation is
being used to characterize the untrustworthiness of an AS
in announcing valid updates, the reputation computed for it
Table 2: Prevalence Persistence and Feedback
Prevalence Persistence Feedback
high high Good (G)
high low Unnecessary (B)
low high Good (G)
low low Inaccurate (U)
has three properties: (1) the initial reputation of the AS is
always maximum and decreases as incidences of poor behav-
iors are observed; (2) more recently observed poor behaviors
are weighed more heavily than older ones, as it has been ob-
served that a recent poor behavior is usually a precursor to
another one; and (3) the reputation of an AS a is a vector
of the form [RepB(a), RepU (a)], where RepB(a) is the rep-
utation of an AS a based on each of its entry in the B set.
Similarly, RepU (a) is the reputation of an AS a based on
each of its entry in the U set.
Formally, reputation is defined by the following function:
RepX(a) =
X
ti
2−(tnow−ti)/hX (1)
Here RepX(a) is the reputation of an AS a for exhibiting
one of the poor behavior X, tnow is the current time and
ti ∈ X.T is the time-stamp of when a X was observed, and
hx is the half-life of the decay function for exhibiting the
behavior X. The values of tnow − ti are in the same units
as h. It can be seen that the reputation returned for an AS
varies between 0 (excellent) and REP MIN3 (poor). To set
the half-life values for RepU (a) and RepB(a), we calculate
the average time difference between two entries in the U
and B set, for each AS. Based on this, we set the half-life
hU and hB to values within which a large majority of the
ASes repeat the respective behavior at least once. As all
ASes are considered “innocent until proven guilty”, they will
all have a initial reputation vector of [0,0], which will change
depending upon their appearance in the B or U set. The
most important aspect of computing reputation of an AS is
to be able to observe and provide feedback on the validity
of updates announced by it. We now describe the properties
that we use for evaluating the validity of updates.
5. AS-BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND ALERT
GENERATION
In this section, we present a detailed look at the set of prop-
erties which are used by the AS Behavior Analyzer com-
ponent of AS-CRED for providing feedback for reputation
computation. In this regard, we consider the following two
3The absolute worst AS is the one which has an entry in the B or
U sets for every possible time-stamp in the learning window and
at each time-stamp it has committed a poor behavior for all pos-
sible prefixes in the IP address space. Therefore, REP MIN =R
2−
(tnow−ti)
h ×
P32
i=1 2
i.
Table 3: AS-CRED (AS-Behavior Analysis) vs. IAR
w.r.t. IRR (NR: No Record in IRR, MR: Match in
IRR (FP), NMR: No Match in IRR (Hijack))
Scheme NR MR NMR
AS-CRED 841 (13.7%) 975 (18.4%) 4323 (81.6%)
IAR 4190 (10.7%) 25892 (74.4%) 8903 (25.6%)
properties: AS-prefix value legality and AS-prefix binding
stability. Before we proceed, we define the term AS-prefix
binding as a claimed ownership of a particular prefix by an
AS. It is established when an AS announces a prefix for the
first time. A binding may have many incidences, which is
defined as an announcement and corresponding withdrawal
of a prefix by an AS. An AS-prefix binding terminates, when
an AS withdraws the prefix and never announces it again.
In the rest of the paper we use the terms AS-prefix bind-
ing, prefix binding and binding, interchangeably. We begin
by describing the various behavior analysis properties used
by AS-CRED to provide feedback along with its capabili-
ties. We then move on to describing the how the reputation
information is disseminated and used.
5.1 Property I: AS-prefix Value Legality
One of the most important properties of AS-prefix binding,
for determining the validity of an update, is the legality of
the values. Typically, ASes and prefixes can only take a
range of values. Any value which does not fall under this
range is considered illegal. Both the values of ASes and
prefixes can be illegal. For example, an AS number is ille-
gal if its value is in the range of 64496-64511 (reserved for
use in documentation and sample code), 64512-65534 (des-
ignated for private use) or 65535 (reserved) [3]. Similarly,
an AS could claim to own a prefix that has not been as-
signed to anyone. Such prefixes, called bogons are spread
over the entire IP address range and can be found in bogon
lists maintained by IANA [5].
One of the most common reasons for illegal AS numbers
to appear in updates is the incorrect application of export
policies by BGP gateway routers [20]. This allows an ille-
gal AS number to remain in the update as it is forwarded
to neighboring ASes. We classify such cases into the B set
due to the nonnecessity of private AS numbers in the up-
dates. However, as the AS number in question is not legal,
which AS do we penalize? Given the fact that we observe
illegal AS numbers in the Internet due to lack of proper fil-
tering, we penalize the first AS which has a legitimate AS
number in the AS path. Therefore, given an update of the
form {p, AS PATH =< ASa, ASb, ..., ASn, ASx >}, where
ASx is the announcer of the prefix p, and ASa is the neigh-
bor of RouteViews. If ASx has a illegal value and ASn
onward all others have legal ones, we add an entry of the
form {ASn, p, t} to the B set. Here, t is the time-stamp
of when the update was received. On the other hand, by
announcing bogons, ASes are providing inaccurate informa-
tion about their prefix ownership. Further, an AS might
want to announce an heretofore unallocated prefix for spam-
ming purposes as suggested in [23]. Therefore, ASes which
send bogons are added to the U set, using an entry of the
form {ASm,−, t}. Here, ASm is the AS announcing the bo-
gon, t is time-stamp of when the update was received. We
leave the entry for the prefix blank as it is not a valid one.
Table 4: Examples of Unnecessary BGP Up-
dates (NAW: Number of Announcements and With-
drawals)
AS Prefix NAW Duration Observed
8452 41.235.83.0./24 2088 Nov. 2 - Nov. 10, 2009
704 152.63.49.180/30 1628 Dec. 8 - Dec. 31, 2009
145 140.217.157.0/24 1080 Nov. 1 - Nov. 27, 2009
The legality properties are amenable to checking based on
largely static lists. This allows us to use them for providing
real-time feedback to the Reputation Manager.
5.2 Property II: AS-prefix Binding Stability
In the inter-domain routing world, we find that legitimate
AS-prefix bindings last for long durations of time and are
very stable in nature [10, 17]. On the other hand, lower
binding duration implies greater chances of invalid updates.
Table 1 shows a list of well-known hijacked prefix announce-
ments in the past. We find that all of them last for a very
short duration of time, i.e., have very low stability. Inspired
by this observation, we present two metrics which can be
used to compute the level of stability of AS-prefix bind-
ings and can therefore be used to potentially deduce non-
necessity or inaccuracy of the updates which contain them.
5.2.1 Prevalence and Persistence
Prevalence (Pr) of a AS-prefix binding is the percentage of
time a prefix is claimed to be reachable by an AS within
a time window (the learning window in our case). More
formally:
Pr(p, AS) =
X
i
(Twi(p, M)− Toi(p, M))/Tlearn (2)
Here, i is the index of all the announcements of prefix p by
AS M during Tlearn (the learning window). Tw(p, M) is the
time prefix p is the withdrawn by M . To(p, M) is the time
prefix p is the announced by M . If the prevalence is above
a threshold then the binding is considered stable. However,
the prevalence metric alone is not sufficient, as it will not
be able to detect instability due to repeated short-duration
binding incidences, that is, AS-prefix bindings which are un-
necessary. We therefore consider another metric in conjunc-
tion with prevalence, called persistence. Persistence (Ps) of
an AS-prefix binding is defined as the average duration of a
binding incidence between an AS and a prefix in the learning
window. More formally:
Ps(p, AS) =
NX
i
(Twi(p, M)− Toi(p, M))/N (3)
Here, N is the number of times the prefix p is claimed to
be owned by the M within the learning window. The rest
of the symbols above have the same meaning as stated ear-
lier. Given the definition of the two metrics it is easy to see
that relationship between persistence and prevalence for an
AS-prefix binding always follows the relation: Ps(p, AS) ≤
Pr(p, AS) × Tlearn ≤ Tlearn. It is important to note, that
both prevalence and persistence metrics are applied to up-
dates received over a time window. They have the benefit of
hindsight as they can see how an AS-prefix binding evolves
after it was first observed.
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Algorithm 1 AS-CRED BGP Update Alert Generation
1: while Update = Recev() do
2: ASP = ExtractASPrefixBinding(Update)
3: if (ASP ∈ White-List) then
4: Continue
5: else
6: Alert(Update, --)
7: Fetch RepB(ASP.AS)
8: Fetch RepU (ASP.AS)
9: if (RepB(ASP.AS) > TB) then
10: Alert(Update, Unnecessary)
11: end if
12: if (RepU (ASP.AS) > TU ) then
13: if (X ∈ White-List, where X.AS = ASP.AS and
X.Prefix ⊂ ASP.Prefix) then
14: Alert(Update, Unnecessary)
15: else
16: Alert(Update, Inaccurate)
17: end if
18: end if
19: end if
20: end while
(b)
Figure 3: (a) Setting TPs and TPr Threshold Values, (b) Alert Generation Algorithm
5.2.2 Feedback
In order to be able to map our observations of AS-prefix
binding stability onto the reputation, we have to classify
them into the GBU sets, which act as the feedback. Table 2
shows the classification based on the prevalence and persis-
tence being above or below two thresholds (see Section 5.2.3).
A value below the threshold is called low and one above is
called high. If an AS-prefix binding exhibits high persistence
and prevalence, it is stable and classified into the G set. This
G set forms the white-list which can be used to identify the
latest set of stable AS-prefix bindings. If the prevalence is
low and persistence is high, it means that the particular AS-
prefix binding did not recur many times, but while it lasted,
it did so for a reasonable amount of time. This is consistent
with legitimate temporary bindings (e.g., backup AS taking
over while the main AS serving the prefixes is down for main-
tenance) as noted in [20] and therefore also classified in the
G set. Low persistence generally indicates poor behaviors.
Malicious entities typically exhibit short AS-prefix binding
incidences in order to avoid detection and engage in nefar-
ious activities such as sending spam or mounting targeted
denial of service attacks [10, 23]. Therefore, we categorize
all bindings with low prevalence and persistence in the U
set. On the other hand, bindings with high prevalence and
low persistence are classified in the B set. We do so because
given the poor persistence, in order to meet the prevalence
threshold, such AS-prefix bindings repeat a large number
of times in an unsustained manner and thus are essentially
unnecessary updates.
Given this basic classification of AS-prefix bindings, we now
apply a set of refinements to reclassify common mistakes
made by ASes while announcing a particular prefix. The
refinements move the AS-prefix binding from the U set to B
set. Inspired by [17, 20] we use two criteria in this regard:
(1) R1: De-aggregation: According to this refinement, an
AS Y whose binding with prefix p′ has been classified in the
U set, is reclassified to the B set, if there is a AS-prefix bind-
ing {Y, p}, such that p′ ⊂ p. We do this because the AS in
question already has a stable binding with a super-prefix (p),
therefore there is a good possibility that it owns p′ as well.
However, as the AS-prefix binding incidence was not long
enough (low prevalence and persistence), its announcement
(in this context) was unnecessary without actually being in-
accurate; (2) R2: Old AS in the Path: According to this
refinement, if an AS Y claims to own a prefix p such that
the associated path vector contains the ID of the AS (say AS
W ) which originally announced p but never withdrew, this
is again considered a potential violation of the necessity re-
quirement without actually being inaccurate, and therefore
classified in the B set.
5.2.3 Prevalence and Persistence Thresholds
In order to set the thresholds for prevalence (TPr) and per-
sistence (TPs), we use BGP updates within the learning
window from Nov. 1, 2009 to Dec. 31, 2009 and compute
the prevalence and persistence for each AS-prefix binding
seen during this time. We then set the TPr and TPs to dif-
ferent values and classify the bindings into the GBU sets.
For each TPr and TPs pair, we compare the entries in
the GBU set with Internet Routing Registries (IRR), and
compute the false positives (FP). Given our “innocent until
proven guilty” stance with respect to AS reputation, one of
our primary concerns in setting prevalence and persistence
thresholds is to minimize FPs. Figure 3 (a) shows our analy-
sis using IRR for different TPr and TPs. Notice that we do
not have to consider false negatives (FN) in identifying the
threshold values as it falls entirely under the FP surface. We
find that the lowest FP value is obtained at TPr = 1% and
TPs = 4 hours. However, for this work, we chose the values
TPr = 1% and TPs = 10 hours as our thresholds. Our
decision is based on three factors: (1) the value of 10 hours
allows us to capture 95% of the poor behaviors as suggested
in [20]; (2) the difference between the false positives at the
two points was less than one percent (17.7% to 18.4%); and
(3) a TPs of 10 hours as opposed to 4 hours prevents an AS
from gaming the system by sustaining an unowned prefix
announcement long enough to avoid detection. Note that,
this FP and FN values for setting the TPr and TPs values
should be seen as a trend rather than a true representation
Percentage of ASes with same, 
better, or worse reputation.
Figure 4: AS-CRED Service Screenshot
of the AS-Behavior Analyzer’s capabilities. This is because,
IRR, which forms the basis of this value is an imperfect
ground truth. Its absolute value is meaningful only in a
comparative sense as we shall see in the next section.
5.3 Quality of AS-Behavior Analysis
As the reputation of an AS depends upon the behavior anal-
ysis mechanism we use, it is necessary to demonstrate its
ability to successfully identify poor AS behaviors. In this
section, we therefore demonstrate the effectiveness of our
AS-behavior analysis.
Inaccurate Behavior: The semantics of an AS-prefix binding
classified as inaccurate (entries in the U set) is that there
is a high probability that the AS involved does not own the
prefix, i.e., the prefix is hijacked. We are able to use the U
set without any alteration because we did not observe any
instance of bogons (see Section 6.1). We compare the num-
ber of cases of prefix hijacking caught by the AS-Behavior
Analyzer with the Internet Alert Registry (IAR) [6] which
is based on a technique called Pretty Good BGP (PGBGP)
[17]. IAR is a prefix hijack alert system which publishes
daily prefix hijacking events in the Internet. We use IAR as
it also uses historical information to make its decisions. For
the purposes of this study, we use the Internet Route Reg-
istry (IRR) to provide a common basis for comparison. Even
though IRR may not always be up to date, we choose it as
there is a lack of any other authoritative source for verifying
the detection results of AS-CRED and IAR. Further, IAR
itself provides the option of using IRR to validate the alerts
it generates. We computed the FP percentage — the per-
centage of AS-prefix bindings with an entry in IRR, which
were incorrectly labeled as hijacking attempts — for both
AS-CRED and IAR. Table 3 shows the results of the com-
parison. Of all the AS-prefix bindings detected as hijacks by
AS-CRED the FP rate is 18.4%, compared to 74.5% in the
case of IAR. AS-CRED, with its large learning window, has a
long-term view of a given AS-prefix binding’s evolution. It is
therefore in a better position to detect prefix hijacking. Con-
sequently, AS-CRED detects only 6139 hijacks compared to
IAR which detects 38985 hijacking events. Another reason
for this discrepancy might be due to the refinements used
by AS-CRED, which IAR does not consider. It can be seen
in that AS-CRED easily outperforms IAR when it comes to
detecting instances of prefix hijacking by dramatically reduc-
ing the false positives. This demonstrates that the detection
mechanism of AS-CRED, though not perfect, provides a con-
siderable improvement over current well-known techniques.
We do not consider false negatives (FN) in this compari-
son as IAR only publishes information on the prefixes which
they believe to be hijacked.
Unnecessary Behavior: The semantics of an AS-prefix bind-
ing classified as unnecessary (entries in the B set) is that
there is a high probability that updates, which announced
it, have little utility. Note that, this excludes updates an-
nounced by BGP Beacons (used for studying BGP dynam-
ics) [4], which many times display similar characteristics.
Table 4 shows some of the prominent cases of unnecessary
updates and the AS-prefix bindings they affect. Analysis
of such bindings based on IRR showed that over 92% of
such cases are instances of legitimate bindings. Further,
such updates belong to bindings which are announced and
withdrawn on an average 42 times more often than updates
whose AS and prefixes were classified in the G set, where
the average number was close to one. This demonstrates
the existence and the extent of the problem.
5.4 Reputation based Alerts
We publish the AS reputation information on a Reputation
Portal and is publicly available at http://rtg.cis.upenn.
edu/qtm/ascred. This reputation in the portal are updated
everyday and the five ASes with the worst reputation, for
that day, are listed. The portal can also be queried to see
the reputation of any AS in the Internet. Additionally, it
provides an alert service, which is designed to flag poten-
tially invalid updates. The alert is generated only on any
new updates received after the learning window. Figure 3
(b) presents the pseudocode of the way the Alert Manager
component of AS-CRED, responsible for this task, works.
The Alert Manager works as follows:
• White-List Filtering: When a new update is re-
ceived, we first checks to see if its corresponding AS-
prefix binding (a, p) is in the white-list (G set). If so,
we consider such updates to be both accurate and nec-
essary and therefore do nothing.
• Alert-List Generation: If (a, p) are not in the white-
list, we post its occurrence on a Alert-List. We then
fetch RepB(a) and RepU (a) for the announcing AS a.
If both the RepU (a) and RepB(a) values are below
their respective thresholds TU and TB we do nothing.
This is because, the announcing ASes have good rep-
utation and are therefore trusted to not send invalid
updates (at this point). Section 6.2 provides more de-
tails on their choice.
• Labeling: Finally, an Unnecessary Alert Type label is
given to all the updates with AS-prefix binding (a, p),
with poor RepB(a) or poor RepU (a) with p ∈ p′ such
that (a, p′) is in the white-list. Similarly, an Inaccurate
label is give to all the updates with AS-prefix binding
(a, p) where RepU (a) is poor with p /∈ p′, ∀p′ where
(a, p′) is in the white-list.
In order to evaluate the accuracy and consistency of alert
generation, every time the alert type is modified to Unnec-
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Figure 5: (a) Feedback Statistics for the Learning Window (Nov. 1, 2009 to Dec. 31, 2009), (b) AS-Behavior
Analysis Statistics
essary and Inaccurate, the associated AS and prefix are also
added to two sets called Non-Necessity (NN) or Inaccurate
(IT), respectively. Note that, update alerts are generated
based on a combination of the white-list and the AS reputa-
tion. This makes it very difficult for rogue ASes to accumu-
late good reputation for announcing invalid updates. This
is because, such AS-prefix bindings will not be found in the
white-list and therefore always flagged.
6. AS-CRED ANALYSIS RESULTS
In this section, we first present statistics on the behavior
analysis aspect of AS-CRED, based on which reputation is
generated, and then present the results of our analysis of AS
reputation and alerts generated.
6.1 AS-Behavior Analysis
Evaluating the legality property simply requires comparing
the AS and prefix values against largely static lists. In our
60 day learning window we found a total of 12905 updates
which had an illegal (private or reserved) AS number for
the announcer. Based on our criteria of punishing the first
legitimate AS number in the AS PATH of such updates, we
found that 134 ASes were involved in such behavior. The
top graph in Figure 5 (a) displays the (sorted) number of
incidences of AS-prefix bindings with an illegal value. It
can be seen that for many ASes, there are multiple inci-
dences, attesting to the repetitiveness of such behavior. As
for bogons, we observed zero incidence in the learning win-
dow. This is probably because bogons are the most well
known BGP routing problem and filtered at the peers of our
data collector and never forwarded. The net effect of this
is that the U set does not have any entries due to bogons,
but only from poor AS-prefix binding stability. The bottom
two graphs in Figure 5 (a) show the number of incidences of
AS-prefix bindings exhibiting poor behavior, again demon-
strating the repetitiveness.
Figure 5 (b) shows the behavior analysis results. Over 33K
ASes were observed during this period, out of which only
2261 (7%) ASes were found to display anything other than
good behavior. Only 168 ASes displayed exclusively poor
behaviors (for all prefixes they announce) which amounts to
about 0.4% of all the ASes. Over 376K AS-prefix bindings
were observed, out of which about 8.6% were classified as
poor behaviors. The figure also shows the number of actual
entries in the U and B sets. The number of entries in both
the sets is of course much larger than the number of unnec-
essary and inaccurate AS-prefix bindings, because multiple
updates can affect the same AS-prefix bindings. It can be
seen that the number of unnecessary updates were much
higher than the number of inaccurate ones, demonstrating
the importance of monitoring it.
6.2 AS Reputation Analysis
With the data analyzed and feedback obtained in the form
of the GBU sets, we can now compute the reputation of the
ASes. The half-life value chosen is hU = 6 days for RepU
and hB = 3 days for the RepB , because over 75% of the
ASes announcing inaccurate and unnecessary updates, re-
peat it within 6 and 3 days, respectively. The choice of the
half-life values also has an impact on the learning window.
Given these half-life values, after 60 days an incidence of
announcing inaccurate and unnecessary updates will con-
tribute only 2−10 and 2−20 to the overall reputation, respec-
tively. Therefore, our 60 day learning window is sufficient
for this work. Another, reason for choosing a large learning
window is that it makes the behavior analysis immune to
Byzantine failures of ASes, network outages, BGP update
fluctuation, and route-flaps. As long as ASes do not experi-
ence frequent outages over the entire learning window, the
reputation of the AS is unaffected. To choose the TB and
TU values, we used the reputations from the first learning
window to trigger alerts for the updates received on Dec.
31, 2009. The decisions about the nature of the alerts (trig-
gered for potential non-necessity or inaccuracy of updates)
were then evaluated based on the consistency verification
window, which has the benefit of hindsight. The chosen val-
ues of the threshold were TB=10 and TU =90 as they resulted
in the lowest false and missed alerts.
Figure 6 (a) shows the RepU and RepB values on Jan. 1,
2010. The figure shows only those ASes whose reputation
(untrustworthiness) is greater than zero. As most of the
ASes do not display poor behaviors they are not listed in the
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Figure 7: Alert Generation Window Update Statis-
tics
two graphs. Even among those listed, the 693 ASes (see Fig-
ure 5 (b)) which announced inaccurate updates, 90% have
reputation very close to zero. This demonstrates the sensi-
tivity of AS-CRED in being able to detect and capture even
those ASes which rarely announce poor updates. The same
holds for the 1568 ASes which announced unnecessary up-
dates. This is expected as reputation degradation depends
on exhibiting repeated poor behaviors, which very few ASes
did (Figure 5(a)). Figure 6 (b) shows the worst performing
ASes over the 10 alert generation windows.
6.3 Alert Analysis
Figure 7 shows the total number alerts generated for the
updates received during the 10 alert generation windows.
We find that the number of alerts for unnecessary updates
with poor stability (in NN set) range from 2-4% of the total
number of updates. This is an order of magnitude greater
than updates classified as inaccurate (in IT set) and the
unnecessary updates with illegal AS numbers (also in the
NN set). In the rest of the section we demonstrate that the
alerts generated by AS-CRED are not only accurate but also
consistent with the behavior analysis.
Alert Accuracy: We now compare the accuracy of the alert
generated by AS-CRED, with IAR, with respect to IRR. In
this regard, we analyze the updates that AS-CRED classi-
fied into the IT set (those considered inaccurate) during each
of the 10 alert generation windows with the performance of
IAR during the same time frame. Table 5 shows the FP
results for the entries in the IT set and IAR, with respect
to IRR. We can again see that for AS-CRED (9.3%) this
is about eight times smaller than IAR (75.4%). The perfor-
mance of AS-CRED is better compared to IAR because of
its excellent hijack detection capabilities during the behavior
analysis, as we saw in Section 5.3. These results demonstrate
the marked improvement of AS-CRED in triggering alerts
for prefix hijacking attempts over existing mechanisms. We
reiterate that the FP rate should not be viewed as a rep-
resentation of AS-CRED’s capabilities. It value should be
evaluated in comparison with IAR’s FP, given the imperfect
nature of our ground truth IRR.
For all the alerts that we triggered for updates deemed un-
necessary, we found that 88% of them in the IRR, which
demonstrate that the AS owns the prefix it announced in
such updates. The average number of announcements and
withdrawal of such unnecessary updates was around 26 with
a maximum value being 4492. This is in contrast to the up-
dates carrying AS-prefix bindings found in the G set, where
the average number of announcements and withdrawals was
very close to one.
Alert Consistency: As reputation is generated based on the
behavior analysis of ASes, it is important to know whether
the reputation value is a true representation of behaviors
that were observed during the analysis. The alert generation
algorithm records the reasons for the generating alarms into
two sets NN and IT. In order to verify if this classification
into NN and IT sets is consistent with our behavior analysis
mechanism, we make use of the consistency verification win-
dow to classify (with the benefit of hindsight) into GBU sets
all the AS-prefixes which triggered an alarm during the 10
alert generation windows. Ideally, all bindings we classified
in the NN set should be found in the B set computed using
data from the consistency verification window, while all the
entries in IT set should be in the U set. About 7.4 million
updates were received over the 10 alert generation windows,
out of which about 2.2% triggered an alert (Figure 7). Of
the updates which triggered an alert, about 1.63% did so
Table 5: AS-CRED (IT set) vs. IAR w.r.t. IRR
(NR: No Record in IRR, MR: Match in IRR (FP),
NMR: No Match in IRR (Hijack))
Scheme NR MR NMR
AS-CRED 112 (18.1%) 42 (8.3%) 465 (91.7%)
IAR 413 (11.2%) 2437 (75.4%) 798 (24.6%)
for being potentially inaccurate, the rest (98.37%) for being
potentially unnecessary. This demonstrates an important
observation of this work: at the moment, unnecessary up-
dates are a much more serious problem than inaccurate ones
in the Internet. Table 6 shows the results of this consistency
evaluation. 98.8% of all the updates which generated alerts
for being inaccurate (those in the IT set) turned out to be
classified in the U set when looked at, in hindsight. This
number is 97.4% for the updates which generated alerts for
being unnecessary (those in the NN set). As the reputation
function is dependent on the behavior analysis, we cannot
expect it to better it. With the consistency check, we en-
sure: what we predict based on the past, is consistent when
we look back at it from the future.
6.4 Summary of Results
The following are the principal take-away from these results:
(1) Repetitive Behavior: ASes which announce invalid
updates do so repeatedly, which makes reputation a good
metric to characterize them; (2) Large number of Un-
necessary Updates: The number of unnecessary updates
with poor stability far outnumber the inaccurate ones and
those with illegal values; (3) Sensitivity: The reputation
metric is very sensitive and can capture ASes which seldom
announce invalid updates; (4) Improved Hijack Detec-
tion: The AS-behavior analysis and alert service are much
more accurate than existing services (such as the IAR) for
detecting prefix hijacking; and (5) Consistency of Anal-
ysis and Reputation: The reputation assigned to an AS
is a representative and behavior predictive value.
It is worth mentioning at this point that, an analysis of
AS reputation computed based on RIPE-RIS [8] database
yielded identical reputation value for ASes in 99% of the
cases. The differences observed were mainly due to Route-
Views observing many more prefixes and not filtering /32
prefixes, compared to RIPE. One of the ways to compensate
for this discrepancy is make available multiple credit-rating-
like services based on different data sources.
7. RELATED WORK
Recent years have seen considerable work in the area of en-
suring BGP update validity. These works can be broadly
classified into two categories: (1) those that consider the
invalid updates as a misconfiguration, and (2) those that
consider update invalidity as an act of malice.
In [20] the authors present a detailed look at the potential
misconfiguration issues in BGP. They classify the types of
misconfiguration observed into two categories: origin and
export misconfiguration. Origin misconfiguration relates to
accidentally announcing incorrect prefix ownership informa-
tion, while export misconfiguration deals with the violation
of policies associated with routes exported by a particular
AS. A similar work on detecting origin misconfiguration was
Table 6: Consistency between Alerts Generated and
Behavioral Analysis in Hindsight
Classification Count
Total NN set entries 3546
NN set entries classified in the G set 71 (2.5%)
NN set entries classified in the B set 2591 (97.4%)
NN set entries classified in the U set 3 (0.1%)
Total IT set entries 625
IT set entries classified in the G set 7 (0.2%)
IT set entries classified in the B set 0 (0%)
IT set entries classified in the U set 618 (98.8%)
studied in [27], where the principal aim is to detect MOAS
(Multiple Origin ASes) prefixes. The paper assumes that
invalid prefix bindings are always broadcasted by multiple
ASes. Consequently, it suggests the inclusion of a “MOAS
list” with every new prefix announcement. The list provides
the IDs of all the ASes who can announce it legitimately.
If an AS (one not on the list) announces the same prefix,
the approach immediately flags this. Detecting malicious
attacks on the BGP routing infrastructure has received its
own share of attention. Many of these schemes analyze his-
torical updates announced by ASes and use the information
for detecting any subsequent malicious updates [17, 19, 22].
Another approach is to use data-plane probing, where an
AS, on suspecting an update to be attempted hijack, probes
the announcer to verify its suspicion [16, 26, 28]. The fo-
cus of all these approaches is limited to detecting instances
of inaccuracy, none of these approaches can address the ne-
cessity aspect of update validity, nor provide a quantitative
way to model AS’ tendency to announce them.
In [24] the authors use the notion of reputation for accepting
or rejecting updates based on trusted overlay network over
the existing AS topology. Once such an overlay is setup, a
node which wants to determine the accuracy of an update,
with respect to prefix hijacking and AS path spoofing, can
simply query its neighbors in the overlay network. Simi-
larly, in [15], the authors present a reputation system for
ASes, with a focus on preventing propagation of bogus rout-
ing information. However, their mechanism also depends
on computing reputation based on an alliance of ASes. As
AS-CRED does not depend on inputs from other ASes to
compute reputation, it does not have to compensate for any
biased feedback.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented AS-CRED service which quan-
tifies the level of trust one can have in ASes with respect
to announcing valid updates. In this regard, it utilizes a
simple reputation function to determine the reputation of
ASes based on feedback provided by analyzing the past up-
dates for validity. The reputations are then used to track
and trigger alerts for potential inaccurate or unnecessary
updates announced in the Internet. One of the by-products
of computing reputation for ASes in a white-list which lists
the AS-prefix bindings obtained from valid updates. Such a
list can be used by providers to identify prefixes owned by
their customers in order to prevent routing valleys that may
exist within a AS PATH as pointed out in [12]. In the future,
we plan to extend this work by including other properties
for determining an AS’ tendency to announce valid updates,
such as presence of valley-free path and stable links in the
AS PATH.
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